Research

Here you find a list of the current research projects from the chair. For more informations follow the links.

A New Model of Executive-Legislative Relations

The project analyzes, theoretically and empirically, democracies in which the cabinet is selected by a legislature that is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the cabinet in a no-confidence vote. (see project on research gate)

Part of this project is Alexander Pörschke’s ongoing dissertation projects that analyses legislative voting in the Senates of the bicameral Australian states.

Publications:

• Ganghof, S./ Eppner, S./ Pörschke, A. (2018): Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism: patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies. Australian Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 211-233. [Link]
• Ganghof, S./ Eppner, S./ Pörschke, A. (2018): Semi-parliamentary government in perspective: concepts, values, and designs. Australian Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 264-269. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2016): Das Regierungssystem-Trilemma: Zur Beziehung zwischen Exekutive und Legislative in fortgeschrittenen Demokratien. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 57 (1), 27-52. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2016): Combining proportional and majoritarian democracy: An institutional design proposal. Research and Politics, 3(3), 2053168016665640. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2014): Bicameralism As a Form of Government (Or: Why Australia and Japan Do Not Have a Parliamentary System). Parliamentary Affairs, 67(3), 647-663. [Link]

An Equilibrium Theory of Institutional Veto Players

The project develops elements of an equilibrium theory of institutional veto players. A basic idea is that institutional veto players such as powerful upper houses, are more likely to be destabilized - everything else being equal - the greater their restriction of actors' behavior, especially in cabinet formation.

Two dissertational projects by Sebastian Eppner and Katja Heeß take closer looks at related issues: Heeß developes her own theory of the reform of veto institutions and tests it with a novel dataset using QCA methods. Eppner analyses the effect of veto institutions on government formation with a new dataset on the composition of upper houses using mixed and conditional logit models. Both dissertations use case studies to complement their statistical analyses. (see project on reseach gate)

Publications:

• Heeß, K. (2017): Einschränkung der Mehrheitsdemokratie? Institutioneller Wandel und Stabilität von Vetopunkten. Nomos. [Link]
• Ganghof, S./ Eppner, S. (2016): Equilibrium Veto Players. Veto Institutions, Cabinet Formation and Institutional Change. 2016 EPSA General Conference, September 7-10th, Prague. [pdf]
• Eppner, S./ Ganghof, S. (2016): Institutional Veto Players and Cabinet Formation. The Veto Control Hypothesis Reconsidered. European Journal of Political Research, 56 (1), 169–186. [Link]
• Eppner, S./ Ganghof, S. (2015): Do (Weak) Upper Houses Matter for Cabinet Formation? A Replication and Correction. Research & Politics, 2 (1), 2053168015577969. [Link]
• Eppner, S./ Ganghof, S. (2014): Symmetric Bicameralism and Cabinet Formation. 2014 ECPR General Conference, Glasgow. [Link]
• Eppner, S. (2014): Der Einfluss legislativer Vetopunkte auf die Regierungsbildung. Dissertation, Universität Potsdam, Germany
• Ganghof, S. (2010): Democratic inclusiveness: A reinterpretation of Lijphart’s patterns of democracy. British Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 679-692. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2010): Resiliente Demokratietypen. Eine vergleichende AnalyseResilient types of democracy. A comparative analysis. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 4(1), 5-27. [Link]

Majority Formation in Parliamentary Systems of Government

The project analyzes institutions and behavioral patterns of democratic majority formation in parliamentary systems of government. It compares the rationales of different models of majority formation -- based on the stages of the decision-making process at which majorities are formed -- and investigates under which background conditions the goals of these models can be attained. Special attention is given to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions and the governing strategies of minority cabinets. (see project on research gate)

Publications:

• Ganghof, S. (2016): Reconciling representation and accountability: Three visions of democracy compared. Government and Opposition, 51(2), 209-233. [Link]
• Stecker, C./ Ganghof, S. (2016): Die Institutionalisierung wechselnder Mehrheiten: Minderheitsregierungen im internationalen Vergleich. [Link]
• Ganghof, S./ Eppner, S./ Heeß, K. (2015): Normative balance and electoral reform: A Finnish puzzle and a comparative analysis. West European Politics, 38(1), 53-72. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2015): Four Visions of Democracy: Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and beyond. Political Studies Review, 13(1), 69-79. [Link]
• Ganghof, S./ Stecker, C. (2015): Investiture rules in Germany: Stacking the deck against minority governments. Oxford Univ. Press. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2015): Four Visions of Democracy: Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and beyond. Political Studies Review, 13(1), 69-79. [Link]
• Ganghof, S./ Stecker, C./ Eppner, S./ Heeß, K. (2012): Flexible und inklusive Mehrheiten? Eine Analyse der Gesetzgebung der Minderheitsregierung in NRW. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 43(4), 887-900. [Link]

Political Equality and Institutional Design

The project analyzes the role that the value of political equality can play in motivating and justifying specific institutional designs of democracy. It analyzes different conceptions of equality as well as potential conflicts between equality and liberty or between equality and the pursuit of good outcomes. (see project on research gate)

Publications:

• Ganghof, S. (2016): Reconciling representation and accountability: Three visions of democracy compared. Government and Opposition, 51(2), 209-233. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2015): Is the ‘Constitution of Equality’Parliamentary, Presidential or Hybrid?. Political Studies, 63(4), 814-829. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2013): Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 12(2), 179-196. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2013). Equality-Based Comparison: How to Justify Democratic Institutions in the Real World. Politics, 33(2), 101-111. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2012): Gaus, Gerald. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 53(4), 692-695. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2009): Lässt sich eine „Verfassung der Rechtfertigung “rechtfertigen? Zur Rolle demokratischer Entscheidungsregeln im Liberalismus. ZPol Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 19(2), 275-302. [Link]
• Ganghof, S. (2005): Politische Gleichheit und echte Mehrheitsdemokratie. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 15(3), 741-763. [Link]

Models of Democracy and Democratic Performance

The model critically evaluates claims about the rationale, distinctiveness and performance of particular models of democracy. (see project on research gate)

Publications:

The project reflects on research design, explanation and theory testing in political science. Special attention is paid to the role of basic research questions, to the methodological implications of deductively valid formal theories and to the logical relation between "competing" theories or hypotheses. Substantially, a special focus is on veto player theory. (see project on research gate)

Publications: